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Updated: 42 min 40 sec ago

Deterrence and Defense on NATO's Eastern Flank

Fri, 05/10/2019 - 14:43

Towards A Mediterranean Arms Control Regime

Fri, 05/03/2019 - 17:04

This paper calls for establishing an arms-control regime in the Mediterranean region. It addresses the political determinants of such a regime in terms of regional relations and arms posture, and stands of regional and extra-regional powers. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regulation and reduction of conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons (SALW), combatting illicit arms trade in the region and engagement of all the relevant States are imperative in determining the Mediterranean arms control structure. The main commitment of extra-regional powers should be nonviolation of the prospected Mediterranean arms-control regime, especially the WMD-free status whenever in force. For that sake, confidence-building measures should be adopted in order to build the three pillars of the regime: legal instruments, institutional structure, and monitoring and verification mechanisms. The Mediterranean arms control architecture could be easily crafted if it goes normative through creating a regional identity based on universal values, and supporting that normative transformation with a Mediterranean ‘Marshall Plan’. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) could be revitalized through the foundation of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean (CSCM) at the governmental level to be the permanent governing organ of the UfM with a view to administrate the arms control regime in the Mediterranean.

Keywords:

The Concept of Deterrence and its Applicability in the Cyber Domain

Fri, 05/03/2019 - 17:04

This work is the product of a research, conducted in the course of the Master’s Program in International Security Studies and seeks to give cyber deterrence its deserved (non-technical) attention in the academia. It will focus in a first article on the concept of deterrence and its applicability in the cyber domain in general. The second part, in a later article, will scrutinize ways for Germany, as an important player in an ever more digitized international system, to approach a cyber deterrence strategy in order to bolster its national security interests.

Cyber space as the fifth domain is omnipresent and all developed states increasingly realize that international relations and typical domains of statehood change in the face of a global digitization. With the advent of game-changing technologies, traditional tools of statecraft, such as deterrence, seem disregarded as outdated in the national security strategy building process. Advanced states in particular depend heavily on an open and safe cyber domain but at the same time suffer from manifold vulnerabilities. The recent past showed that sophisticated cyber attacks have the potential to disrupt governments, economies and societies significantly and therefore pose a threat to core security interests. Deterrence, as classical tool in international relations, can help to bolster national security interests, even if the cyber domain requires some special considerations.

Therefore, the article explains basic mechanisms of deterrence in the nuclear age and in contemporary international relations, the legal framework of cyber space and possible ways to apply deterrence in the cyber domain. It aims to urge global leaders to thoroughly consider deterrence in the cyber domain as a powerful asset and to provide policymakers with options for action

Cross-domain Coercion as Russia’s Endeavor to Weaken the Eastern Flank of NATO. A Latvian Case Study

Fri, 05/03/2019 - 17:04

Cross-domain coercion is tangible on NATO’s Eastern flank and characterized by the use of derogative propaganda, fake news, financial assets in Latvian banking system, Russian-based organized crime and the military elements. This study on cross-domain coercion, however, concentrated also on the cohesion of Latvian population, existing gaps within the society and its susceptibility to be exploited by Russia. To acquire data for this study, the researcher conducted interviews with representatives of the Eastern flank countries, and conducted an extensive literature study. To determine the root causes of vertical division in the society, “5 WHYs” method was used. This research has proved that the presence of Russian minority and Russian-based organized crime (RBOC) minority can be a good base to create an unrest, and that Russia is able to influence the internal policy of a country when the Russian economic footprint exceeds 12% of GDP. The demographics and the cohesion (including vertical and horizontal divisions) of the society are factors determining the resistance of Latvia. The triumph of the populist parties during the October 2018 parliamentary elections reflect the trend that the nation is tired of the corrupt and ineffective government rather than it is drifting towards Russia. In a broader scope, it is expected that cross-domain coercion will increase and Russia will test the cohesion of NATO.

Deterrence and Defense at the Eastern Flank of NATO and EU: Readiness and Interoperability in the Context of Forward Presence

Fri, 05/03/2019 - 17:04

The paper is based on the discussions at the conference of the Atlantic Council of Bulgaria in September 2018, sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and focusses on the NATO / EU posture in Eastern Europe for defense and deterrence. Special attention is given to the development of the Bucharest Initiative (B9) and its influence on the Western Balkans and Black Sea Region. Based on the defense posture and in the context of the developments in NATO (and EU) for improved readiness and interoperability, including with the partners, the authors propose a Program for Readiness and Interoperability (PRI), oriented to C4ISR area together with enhanced cooperation in education and training for the defined B9+ region as instruments to instrumentalize this cooperation and improve the deterrence and defense capacity on the Eastern Flank of NATO and EU, while at the same time strengthening the resilience to hybrid threats.

Deterrence in Eastern Europe in Theory and Practice

Fri, 05/03/2019 - 17:04

Canadian Policy Dilemmas in Deterrence and Disarmament

Thu, 10/04/2018 - 14:53
This article suggests that Canadian policy is dissonant in the current strategic dilemma opposing NATO and Russia over the Baltic States and Ukraine. On the one hand, Canada is a reliable, willing and respected partner in NATO, committed to making the Alliance credible to the Baltic States and to NATO adversaries. But while this credibility is buttressed by NATO nations’ conventional forces, Russia cannot meet this deterrent safely without relying on nuclear weapons. Canada has always been a proponent of responsible use of nuclear energy, and has been at the forefront of campaigns at NATO to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons for achieving political objectives. Nevertheless, NATO being a nuclear alliance, Canada cannot opt out of this aspect of the organization and still participate actively in forward deployments. We argue that Canadian participation and promotion of Ballistic Missile Defense will relieve this policy dissonance because BMD requires disarmament to function more fully. This development would enable a defensive transition, make Baltic reassurance safer, reduce Russian nuclear reliance, and provide a more ethical alternative to deterrence.

Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) in Ukraine: The Limits of NATO’s Education Programme

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

Ukraine Security Sector Reform: Is Ukraine taking Western advice?

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

Defence Institution Building in Ukraine at Piece and at War

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

Defense Institution Building from Above? Lessons from the Baltic Experience

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

Defense Against Negative Strategic Communications

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

NATO’s Defense Institution Building in the Age of Hybrid Warfare

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

NATO’s Defense Institution Building and Projecting Stability

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

The Persistent Demand for Defense Institution Building

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16
Editorial article for the special issue on Defense Institution Building

The Future of Terrorism: The Practitioners’ View

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

Armenia and the South Caucasus: A New Security Environment

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

The importance of the Council of Europe’s 24/7 Network of Contact Points on Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

The Age of Post-Truth: State Influence and Strategic Communication Contemporary Security Challenges on Europe’s Eastern Flank

Mon, 10/01/2018 - 18:16

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