Connections

This article examines the evolution of Belarusian statehood, highlighting the transition from its independence in 1991 to the increasingly authoritarian regime under President Aleksandr Lukashenka. It scrutinizes the complex relationship between Lukashenka and Russian President Vladimir Putin and the repeated breaches and renegotiations of their political contract. The analysis covers Belarus’ oscillation between integration with Russia and attempts at Western engagement, particularly noting the period of soft Belarusification from 2014 to 2020 as a response to fears of Russian annexation. The 2020 presidential elections marked a turning point, with mass protests against Lukashenka’s claimed victory leading to severe crackdowns and the erosion of Belarusian sovereignty. The article argues that Belarus’ support for Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine signifies a further decline in its autonomy. It advocates for a strategic approach by the West, bolstering the Belarusian opposition, supporting independent media, and exploiting moments of Russian weakness to restore and secure Belarusian democracy and independence. The author suggests that through comprehensive support for Ukraine and a proactive stance on Belarus, the West can counteract the Kremlin’s influence and prevent Russia's complete absorption of Belarus.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, ignited discussions about ways to curb Russia’s ambitions in reshaping the post-WWII world order. This article critically examines the ongoing dialogue surrounding the potential designation of the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. We will delve into both the arguments in favor and against this move while also exploring the current political outcomes of this contentious debate. Previously, we conducted a comparative analysis of the criteria for including countries in the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and the activities of the Russian Federation. This article outlines the potential repercussions of such a designation, including restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, controls over exports of dual-use items, and various financial and other restrictions. Sanctions penalizing countries and individuals for engaging in trade with designated states are of particular significance. The Russian Federation has already been recognized as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/ regime in Ukraine and the EU; hence, the main emphasis will be on the United States. This is due to the fact that resolutions from other states are often symbolic gestures with limited consequences, whereas inclusion in the U.S. Department of State’s list can have a profound impact on Russia.

At the threshold of its third year, Russia's large-scale and brutal war against Ukraine continues to kill thousands, terrorize millions of Ukrainians, and disrupt international supply chains, affecting global energy and food markets. This is the second journal issue dedicated to the ongoing war. It dwells on the issue of lustration - a problem Ukraine did not effectively address during its post-communist transition, which in turn led to the perpetuation of the Kremlin's ideology and, thus, its continuous influence on Ukrainian politics and society. Two articles explore the rationale for including Russia in the U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism. While some European countries and the European Parliament have already declared Russia a terrorist state, the debate in the United States is influenced by numerous additional considerations, and the decision is still pending. The link between military expenditures, defense industrial investments, and the general economic development and stability in wartime is also examined in detail. The final two articles analyze Moscow's interests and strategy towards the post-Soviet states and the strategically important Black Sea region.

The full-scale war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, began under a false assumption regarding the underlying grand strategy. The ongoing conflict has presented difficult choices for the states in the former Soviet Union, who have approached it with a mix of rational calculation and emotional considerations, viewing it as a conflict between two once brotherly nations. While Russia continues to wield significant influence, and some states depend on it as a security guarantor, the general consensus among the ten states is that Russia’s power and influence are waning. Consequently, they anticipate that Russia will pay less attention to its regional partners, allocate fewer resources to them, and that close association with Russia would strain relations with other important actors, particularly in the West. Russia’s influence has led seven of the ten states to not fully align with either the West or Moscow. While multilateral cooperation through organizations like the CSTO and EAEU was not paramount due to the prevailing “hub and spoke” structure, these states now face a noticeable stalemate. Despite Russia’s lingering influence, fueled in part by economic disparities, a rapid “growing apart” occurs in the area of the former Soviet Union. Some actors are distancing and disengaging faster than ever, leading to a shifting geopolitical landscape.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, military tensions in Europe have significantly decreased. However, the rapid evolution of weapon systems, warfare formats, and geopolitical trends of regional and global players in the international arena have led to increased demand for arms, rising military expenditures, and military escalations. In response to Russia’s armed aggression, Ukraine has begun the process of building up its military power, which, in turn, has caused an economic shock. This article aims to highlight the current trends in militarization and economic growth and analyze the military power and economic indicators of Ukraine, some NATO member states, and Russia. The study’s subject is the indicators of several states’ military and economic capabilities. The study was conducted using empirical research, analysis and synthesis, and formulation of assumptions. The article examines the problematic issues of Ukraine’s economic growth and military capability, focusing on the period leading up to the full-scale war. The study covers a set of fundamental events in Ukraine’s historical paradigm. It identifies trends in establishing close diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Western countries. At the same time, the work reveals the importance of transforming the state’s military and economic capabilities.

The article analyzes the primary reasons for designating the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The issue gained prominence with the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—the largest and deadliest armed conflict in Europe since World War II—challenging the unity of the Collective West and the global security system. The vision of a peaceful and prosperous European space from Lisbon to Vladivostok has been permanently shattered.
To achieve its geopolitical objectives, Russia has been involved in numerous armed conflicts since 1991, such as in Georgia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and now Ukraine, orchestrated operations on the soil of other states, and supported terrorist organizations. Aspiring to be a superpower in the aftermath of the USSR, Russia has utilized hybrid warfare instruments for decades to undermine democracies globally and maintain influence over former Soviet republics. Some of its actions can be classified as terrorism, support for terrorism, ethnocide, or genocide.
This article explores the criteria for including countries in the US list of state sponsors of terrorism and compares them with the activities of the Russian Federation. It provides evidence that Russia qualifies for inclusion in the list, although the US still hesitates to designate it as a state sponsor of terrorism or a terrorist state/regime.

The article analyzes the 2019 case "Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine" and the European Court of Human Rights' latest standards regarding the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 in lustration cases. In its judgment on the Polyakh case, the Court found a violation of all applicants' right to respect for private life due to the application of lustration measures by Ukraine. Based on the Court's previous practice regarding lustration in Central and Eastern European states and the Council of Europe's practice, it was concluded that the application of lustration measures, such as dismissal coupled with a ban on holding public office for ten years, along with the premature inclusion of the lustrated person's name into a publicly available lustration list, significantly impacts the person's private life. Consequently, Article 8 of the Convention is deemed applicable. If, instead of dismissal, the applicants had been offered a transfer to other less responsible positions or afforded the possibility of employment in the civil service, the Court, due to the reduced impact of the applied lustration measures on the applicants' privacy, would not have invoked Article 8 of the Convention.

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has brought to the forefront the complex interplay of military, energy, and food security dynamics in the Black Sea region. Russia’s strategic focus on dominating the Black Sea and its littoral areas is evident through weaponization of energy and food exports and its persistent efforts to assert control since Putin’s rise to power in 1999-2000. This aggression underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive Western strategy to address the security challenges of the Black Sea region.
The article argues that the West must prioritize supporting Ukraine and enhancing Black Sea security through a multifaceted approach that encompasses military, political, and economic dimensions. Key missions include ensuring Ukrainian victory, providing energy security to Ukraine, and breaking the Russian blockade of the Black Sea to liberate vital energy and grain shipments. Additionally, efforts to engage with regional actors like Turkey and Azerbaijan are crucial to diversifying energy sources and reducing dependence on Russian resources. By recognizing the interconnectedness of security challenges in the Black Sea region and demonstrating a collective will to address them, the West can mitigate Russia’s influence, promote stability, and establish a more secure and prosperous future for the region.

Under the guise of combating cybercrime, two radically different visions of cyberspace compete for attention on the international stage: a free-flowing model of cyberspace that democracies have championed is now challenged by a so-called sovereign model. Counter-democratic initiatives to reframe cyberspace in strictly national terms are underway with the likely result of decreased cooperation and increased risks of conflict and cybercrime.

Over the past twenty years, Connections has been instrumental in informing and shaping security and defense policy debates within the Partnership for Peace community and beyond. This issue includes updated versions of some of the articles that have had the highest academic and policy-making impact.

The article examines the development and employment of the al-Shabaab secret service, Amniyat, in its fight against African Union troops and security forces in Somalia. It first elaborates on the historical background of the terrorist group, which may serve as an introduction to understanding the roots of the organization and how its resurgence is tied to the effective management of Amniyat. The governance structure and intelligence activities of the terror group are also scrutinized. The study then analyzes the capacities and capabilities of the al-Shabaab intelligence apparatus, highlighting the elements that have contributed to its efficiency. In light of the growing importance of intelligence and counter-intelligence, the development of a secret service proved to be crucial for the survival of the terrorist group. Over the last decade, not only has al-Shabaab survived but also managed to thrive, presenting a number of obstacles to better-equipped multinational forces and the international community. Even if al-Shabaab were to be defeated, Amniyat could outlast its dissolution and may be “reborn” in various entities or merge into a criminal network.

The emergence of newly independent states in the Caucasus at the end of the Cold War presented challenges to Turkey while enlarging its role. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the century-old Soviet/Russian threat, simultaneously creating a power vacuum on Turkey’s borders. While Turkey had traditionally avoided involvement in regional politics, it has since been drawn into the volatile new politics of the region. In this environment, Turkey became an important actor in the region due to its strong historical ties, the attraction of its geographic position linking the region to Europe, and its economic, political, and security relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia. Over the past thirty years, Turkey has become one of the prominent players in a region where its involvement has again increased recently after the Second Karabakh War. Although its re-engagement with Armenia is progressing slowly, and geopolitical changes and economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely to stabilize for some years, it is evident that Turkey will continue to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the regional capitals.

By employing historical institutionalism, this article argues that anthropogenic risks (i.e., climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic) serve as a critical juncture for NATO in reorienting its sustainability strategies in response to climate fluctuations and potential insecurity arising from resource depletion. During the Cold War, NATO’s main objective was to deter threats from states, mainly the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Alliance turned to non-state actors (e.g., Al-Qaida, Somali pirates, and Russian hackers). Then, climate change and COVID-19 emerged as global security risks from natural, environmental phenomena. NATO had incrementally sought to address the threats from climate change, but COVID-19 served as an impetus to acknowledge insecurity caused by neither states nor non-state actors. The pandemic represented the Alliance’s first significant mobilization of military assets on a regional (i.e., European level), for a sustained period, in response to a unique risk. Based on this experience, NATO needs a sustainable strategy to acknowledge anthropogenic risks and to prepare for future climate-related fluctuations and insecurity.

This article analyzes the shaping and transformation of the post-Soviet security thinking of Georgia and Ukraine in the context of the post-Soviet Russian foreign policy in the near abroad, often designated as a legitimate sphere of Russian influence, and the competition between Russia and the EU and the US in the region. After the Rose Revolution of Georgia and the Orange Revolution of Ukraine, these two countries’ independent/pro-Western orientation became the main issues securitized by the Russian Federation. Correspondingly, the preservation of territorial integrity became the top security issue for Georgia (since the early 1990s), and it became so for Ukraine after the Crimean occupation (March 2014) and the renewed armed hostilities across the entirety of Ukraine since February 2022. The changes in the internal politics of these countries were transposed into the international competition between Russia and the EU/US, expressed through the clash of “Sovereign Democracy” and “Color Revolution” paradigms for the future of post-Soviet states in the 2010s and transformed into active military measures in Ukraine since 2020s and through the so-called creeping annexation of Georgia since 2010s. Practically, these are the tools of maintaining the Russian influence on the one hand and opposing the Western values and power influence, supported firstly by the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership projects and secondly by granting candidate status to Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s military actions against Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2023), a response to the soft power applied by the West, aimed at the creation of buffer zones in the shape of “frozen conflicts,” which could be used as indirect leverage in the hands of the Russian Federation to block the Western aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine.

Hybrid warfare is the most common term used by commentators to describe the complexity and multifaceted character of contemporary warfare. Hybrid warfare refers to coercive methods of strategic competition that take place below the threshold of conventional military conflict and is usually applied to the blend of military and non-military methods of warfare employed by the West’s principal adversaries, Russia and China. The term hybrid warfare has evolved from an essentially military concept to one that potentially embraces all the instruments of state power. Hybrid warfare remains an ill-defined and contested term, and there are many other buzzwords, such as irregular warfare, hybrid threats, and gray zone aggression, that are used to describe the same phenomenon. This article examines the evolution of thinking on hybrid warfare and these related concepts. It highlights the challenges that scholars and practitioners have faced in trying to define and apply these terms in the policy environment in a manner that promotes common understanding and strategic coherence.

Armed forces constitute the foundation for the defense and security of their societies. They protect against external threats and, when required, provide coercive power. As a corporate body, they play a prominent role in the ordering of the nation’s affairs, in the development of national security policy, and in the allocation of national resources. Their role is guided by a single principle: their subordination to democratically elected political leadership. This democratic control ensures they serve the societies they protect.
This article identifies the key elements needed to ensure effective democratic control. It examines the role of the executive in the organization and employment of the armed forces and the legislature in providing oversight and accountability. The tensions in defining competence and responsibility where the political and military worlds and perspectives intersect are alleviated in the process of fusion, collision, or reconciliation at all levels, from policy to operations. Democratic control must reflect societal developments as in the influence of information technology or the impressive “genderization” of defense and security. Two decades of transition in Europe have shown that democratic control is a process in which each country adapts the basic principles to its own circumstances.

On August 15, 2021, the 20-year war against the Taliban, led by the US/NATO alliance and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, ended with a dramatic Taliban takeover of power in Afghanistan. For the second time, they announced an acting government in Kabul. The re-emergence of the Taliban in the political arena of Afghanistan necessitates an analysis of how the Taliban and the countries involved in the Afghanistan conflict view each other. What will be the nature of reciprocal relations between the Taliban and other concerned states? How does the Taliban view the different regions that have engaged in Afghanistan over the past 20 years? Moreover, how do various capitals perceive the Taliban, a question frequently asked by media and think tanks? While global actors have viewed the Taliban with different attitudes, how will they perceive them in the future? This article attempts to answer most of these questions.

The Covid-19 pandemic has brought so many uncertainties for society. People are compelled to adapt to the “new normal” in every aspect of their lives. The government of Indonesia introduced new policies to limit the movement of people through the Policy and the Work From Home (WFH) work system. As a result, large-scale social restrictions relied on the Internet, thus posing higher security risks. Even though the use of social media to spread radicalism is no longer considered novel, the pandemic has revamped social media into a more convenient platform for radicals and extremists as more people are engaged on a daily basis. By using qualitative methods, this study aims to analyze how the spread of radicalism through social media has become a tangible threat to Indonesia during the times of pandemic and the government’s response strategy. This study found that the number of social media users in Indonesia peaked at 51.5 % since the start of the pandemic, most of which came from productive age groups. This study concluded that the pandemic had extended recruitment and radicalization through social media by reaching out to more people and spreading diverse narratives and hoaxes. In order to face those threats, Indonesia’s government uses a strategy of combating such narratives, increasing digital literacy, and blocking content and accounts to minimize the echo of radicalization on social media.

Managing defense acquisition in small nations is a considerable challenge that can be overcome by introducing innovative management approaches, strategies, and systems. This article presents a case study on one of the smallest NATO nations, Luxembourg. It demonstrates how applying management concepts from not-for-profit organizations can help small NATO nations to increase their organizational effectiveness. The author employs a framework devised by the Bridgespan Group, consisting of five effectiveness vectors—leadership, decision-making and structure, people, work processes and systems, and culture. This framework facilitates a systematic analysis. The article provides analysis along each of the five vectors with an account of the specific context of the Luxembourg Armed Forces, incorporating pertinent concepts, such as systems thinking, bureaucracy, organizational learning, and organizational culture. This exhaustive analysis unveils four systemic gaps in effectiveness: delayed corrective action, challenges associated with tacit knowledge and second- and third-order learning, the demand for an embedded learning cycle, and the impact of organizational subculture. The article concludes by outlining the necessity for subsequent research aimed at rectifying these identified effectiveness gaps

On February 24, 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the international order changed as sharply and abruptly as it did on the morning of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks when the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article V for the first time in NATO’s history. As a result of Russia’s invasion, NATO’s demand for deterrence capabilities—with the hope that Article V is never again necessary to exercise—is more urgent now than at any time in the 21st century. Because lethality is absolutely necessary but not sufficient, NATO must develop and maintain capabilities that complement lethal force with intermediate force options to complete the deterrence equation across the entire competition continuum.
Intermediate Force Capabilities (IFCs) can deliver immediate value to NATO countries, providing leaders and policymakers with Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) options that can deter enemy actions, as necessary, below the level of lethal combat operations. IFCs, a term introduced into the U.S. Department of Defense in 2020 to define capabilities that bridge the gap between presence and lethal effects, encompass NLWs as well as other additional capabilities and technologies that have utility below the level of armed conflict.