Connections
COVID-19 in the Central Asian Region: National Responses and Regional Implications
Soon after the first instance of COVID-19 in Central Asia was recorded in March 2020 in Kazakhstan, the government took immediate steps to introduce containment and mitigation measures. As cases of COVID-19 appeared soon after in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and later in Tajikistan, the governments swiftly responded, instituting emergency measures, empowering law enforcement and medical authorities to implement a broad range of counter-infection mitigation measures to protect public health. Cross-border travel restrictions were imposed. Lockdowns and sheltering-in-place restrictions were imposed in most major cities and curfews were enforced. Routine commercial air flights were cancelled or significantly reduced in international airports and many domestic airports. New levels of visa restrictions were implemented in all the Central Asian countries. The initial infection containment measures were highly successful in curtailing the early spread of Covid-19. But governments immediately confronted a broad range of social and economic difficulties brought on by Covid-19. The sudden interruption of typical earnings and livelihoods for many people, the disruption of commercial supply chains, the cratering of commodity prices, and, for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular, the loss of migrant labor opportunities and remittances, combined with other consequences of Covid-19 to produce a region-wide economic catastrophe. The pandemic called for immediate steps on the part of all the government of the region and focused attention on addressing the long-term social, economic, and even regional political implications.
The Pandemic in the Middle East and North Africa: Reflections on Current and Future Impacts
Covid-19 has spared no region of the world’s Global South and Global North. For obvious reasons, countries in the Global South are especially hard hit. This includes MENA, as most of its countries and societies belong to the Global South. The outcomes of perennial poverty, authoritarianism, corruption, and other serious long-term deficiencies mean that this virus hit societies extremely ill-prepared to mobilize the tremendous efforts needed to counter not only the immediate but also the immense future challenges. As long-term governance deficiencies and the new challenges emanating from COVID-19 are mutually reinforcing each other, finding and implementing sustainable solutions for the future becomes even more difficult – and more urgently needed. This prospect cannot remain without implications for the whole Mediterranean region – and for Europe. European-MENA partnerships are more needed than ever. In order to be effective, these partnerships need to include many new stakeholders; they need to be based on trust and on the principle that responsibility for regional, national, and especially for human security has to be shared.
Pandemics and Armed Forces: Which Roles Are Appropriate?
In the current pandemic crisis, the armed forces of many nations are being called upon to provide assistance and support to the civil authorities in an ever-expanding fashion. This article explores the kinds of roles, missions, tasks, and functions that the armed forces are carrying out in this crisis and identifies a number of policy considerations for decision-makers to ponder when they consider tasking the armed forces to provide these services.
Balancing Defense and Civil Support Tasks: The Impact of Covid-19 on the Bulgarian Military’s Roles
Military organizations are often called upon to contribute with specific capabilities or to enhance the civilian response capacity in an emergency at home, in particular, when urgent action in a high-risk environment is needed. The emergency related to the Covid-19 pandemic was not an exception. The Bulgarian armed forces have already made an important and highly visible contribution and are prepared to perform additional tasks assigned through the new emergency law. Both the society and the political elites appreciate this military involvement, and ideas for new civil security tasks have emerged. Based on the analysis of legal and doctrinal documents and the responses to an interview, this article provides an overview of the domestic tasks of the Bulgarian armed forces prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, new tasks assigned during the pandemic and the possibilities for and the caveats in the further expansion of the spectrum of domestic tasks. The opinions of 41 respondents in the interviews are almost equally split. A slight majority suggests further expansion of the domestic tasks, serving as a back-up, and building on high-tech capabilities the armed forces already possess or plan to develop. The remaining respondents call for exercising caution, assuring that the military contribution is effective and efficient, and reconsidering the newly assigned coercive tasks. The article also presents the decision-making context, shaped by long-delayed modernization, limited budget, and the severe shortage of personnel. This is the context in which policy-makers need to find an adequate balance between defense and civil support roles and capabilities.
The Legal and Legitimate Combat Against COVID-19: German Curfew-related Case Law
Much has been written about Chinese and Russian attempts to abuse the pandemic to reshape international order in favor of authoritarian regimes. Diplomatic initiatives, staged relief operations, and troll propaganda were rolled out when COVID-19 hit Europe and the USA in early March 2020. These activities meant to insinuate that centralized, illiberal governance models are better prepared to manage the crisis. In contrast, the transatlantic world fights the virus with measures taken in accordance with Rule of Law standards. In a previous paper, the author argued that access to legal remedies makes the difference. In spring and early summer of 2020, courts in Germany decided on a number of cases where claimants challenge lockdown regulations. Some of these decisions deserve a closer look because they deepen the understanding of how constitutional requirements are assessed in lieu of the constraints. The article, therefore, starts with a short summary of the German judicial system to challenge executive decisions. It will then turn to discuss some outstanding court rulings. In the end, the contribution attempts to assess what kind of COVID-19-related case law in Germany emerges. Could the courts balance core constitutional principles, the need to keep a functioning health sector, to allow a number of basic rights untouched, and to prepare a careful economic recovery?
Coronavirus Pandemic and Reactions in the EU Accession Classes of 2004-2007
This article presents the reaction of the East-central European (ECE) countries, members of the EU and NATO, to the Coronavirus pandemic. Understandably, there are major similarities as the pandemic—a global challenge—hit every state of the region, by and large, in the same way. The geographical location, size (absence of great powers) and historical traditions led to the exposure of these countries to the pandemic being closely aligned. The points of international reference of these small and medium-sized countries can be seen to align in different directions as to which other states they watch and often follow when deciding about their steps in such a global crisis. This article cannot be fully comprehensive and will, therefore, focus on the reactions of health and emergency services. It raises the question as to whether any similarities are deterministic or whether there are noticeable differences due to the variety of their political systems and current history.
COVID 19 and No One’s World: What Impact for the European Union?
This article analyzes the EU's response to COVID-19 against the backdrop of a changing international environment, which is characterized by globalization and a global shift of power. It raises the question of the implications of the current COVID-19 pandemic and the dramatic changes in the international system for the EU's internal and external development. The article argues that the EU can seize the opportunity and gain more influence on the global level if it uses its strength as a manager of interdependencies by rulemaking and rule shaping as well as exercising its influence as a central node in transnational networks. Internal cohesion, the support of human rights and democracy and a strong role in global governance are prerequisites for this particular normative and transformative power of the EU.
The Security Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic
At the start of March 2020, roughly two months after its outbreak in the Chinese province of Wuhan, COVID 19 hit Western Europe. Up to 5.7 million people around the world have now tested positive, and more than 350 000 people have died. In Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, France, and Germany alone, more than 135 000 residents have died. At the beginning of the crisis, European countries and the US sealed off their borders and turned inward to slow down the spread of the virus. Schools, universities, retail, and catering sectors were closed. Wherever possible, office staff were sent home to telework and, in varying intensities, laws and decrees were enacted to enforce physical distancing. At first, domestic themes dominated the headlines. The European public witnessed their respective political decision-makers, along with expert virologists and epidemiologists, discussing which steps were needed to keep the infection rates down and to maintain the safety of health sector employees handling patients. Western liberal democracies particularly were caught in the trilemma of trying to save the lives of its inhabitants, to mind the unprecedented restrictions for its citizens’ basic rights, and to ensure economic survival. ...
The Impact of COVID-19 on Salafi-Jihadi Terrorism
The purpose of this article is to evaluate how COVID-19 might impact the future threat posed by Salafi-Jihadi groups and to explain how the current crisis might re-shape the Salafi-Jihadi central message and strategy and in turn impact recruitment, tactics, capability, and leadership, and even doctrine. Salafi-Jihadi groups have found themselves in a dilemma as they have to reckon with the fact that Muslims are not spared from infection despite fervent prayer. If the Coronavirus is the wrath of God against the infidels, why is it also killing the Mujahedeen, and how do you explain it while still maintaining credibility to potential recruits? How do you maintain the Jihad during a global lockdown, where movement is curtailed and resources dry up?
To better understand what we should expect from Salafi-Jihadist groups in the future, the analysis explores three challenges that Jihadi groups will most likely have to overcome as a result of the current crisis: First, the challenge to their strategic mission and capabilities, especially relating to the operationalization of motivations for martyrdom and revenge. Second, the challenge to their ideology, faith, and religious interpretation of scriptures, with impacts on the consistency of their doctrine and “brand.” And Third, the challenge to their unity and ability to provide members with a shared group identity, which may influence recruitment. How Jihadi groups and their leaders address these multi-level challenges will impact their cohesion and effectiveness, and the credibility of their message. It may also have repercussions on leadership and control, which could determine the relevance of the group as a future global threat. The analysis suggests that Salafi-Jihadi terrorism remains a threat both in the short and long-term.
Cybersecurity in Switzerland: Challenges and the Way Forward for the Swiss Armed Forces
The cybersecurity policy of Switzerland is focused on enhancing competencies and knowledge, investing in research and the resilience of critical infrastructures, threat monitoring, supporting innovation, promoting standards, and increasing awareness – all in the framework of public-private, inter-regional, and international cooperation. The armed forces support this policy by developing threat intelligence and attribution capabilities, readiness to undertake active measures in cyberspace, and to ensure operational availability under any circumstances.
Israel Defense Forces and National Cyber Defense
Cybersecurity in and of itself is not particularly new. Contemporary opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities, however, make this a challenging field. It is only natural that rivals exploit newly created opportunities. Conflict, in which adversarial relationships have a cyber dimension, is here to stay. Accordingly, societies must devise an appropriate organization to protect themselves from intentional threats. This article surveys Israel’s approach, outlining the origins and the evolution of the national cyber defense, prevailing threats, doctrinal challenges, and the role military services play in cyber defense.
Responding to the Cyber Threat: A UK Military Perspective
The article reviews the UK military contribution to the national approach to cybersecurity, extending across the continuum of inter-state activity from peace, through cooperation, competition, confrontation, conflict, and war. According to the UK doctrine, the military performs active and passive defensive functions in cyberspace, offensive cyber operations, cyber intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and cyber operational preparation of the environment, and the response actions are not limited to just the cyber domain.
Austria’s National Cyber Security and Defense Policy: Challenges and the Way Forward
The article presents Austria’s cybersecurity policy, set in a whole-of-government context. It is comprehensive, integrated, proactive, and based on solidarity and cooperation within and beyond the European Union. Transparent governance, the cooperation between public agencies, businesses, research institutes, and the citizens, investments in awareness, research and development are expected to protect effectively vital information and critical infrastructures. The Ministry of Defense and the Austrian Armed Forces contribute to the national policy primarily through the Joint Forces Command, the Communication and Information Systems & Cyber Defense Command, and the two intelligence services.
Cyber Defence in Germany: Challenges and the Way Forward for the Bundeswehr
Current conflicts are increasingly carried out in hybrid forms, including attacks on technical networks and campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion. The Bundeswehr has responded to this development by pooling its capabilities in this field and combining them in the new Cyber and Information Domain Service. On par with the classic service branches—Army, Air Force, and Navy—this service, with its approximately 14,500 members, makes an important contribution to the whole-of-government security provision.
How Improved Attribution in Cyber Warfare Can Help De-Escalate Cyber Arms Race
Cyber warfare is a critical component of nation states’ military arsenals, and a cyber arms race has emerged in the absence of international agreements (norms and confidence-building measures) to limit the use of cyber warfare. One key impediment to building consensus on cyber norms and confidence-building measures is a lack of transparency in cyber weapons development and poor attribution of attack perpetrators. Recently, there has been improvement in attribution capabilities based on better data collection and the profiling of known hackers and nation states by intelligence agencies, and this should give impetus to efforts to establish confidence-building measures and cyber norms. This article discusses the need for, and challenges associated with attribution, recent advances that will lead to better attribution, and the collective responsibility of nation states in addressing these challenges. It suggests several initiatives to reduce chances of cyber conflict, as well as to prevent cyber conflicts from escalating such as defining clear processes for attribution, creating neutral bodies for incident analysis, and limiting the scope of retaliation based on the confidence in attribution.
National Cyber Security Strategy and the Emergence of Strong Digital Borders
The growth of Internet and innovation that thrived with it was facilitated by an environment relatively free of controls. Regrettably however, with its deep integration into the societal framework, the Internet has become a potent tool for influencing geopolitical conflicts, including interference in internal affairs of other nations, undermining national security, destabilizing financial infrastructure, and attacks on critical infrastructure. While countries are harvesting the social and economic benefits of the Internet, they are frightened of the threats it poses to national security. In response to these threats, countries are starting to tighten their internet borders and developing their cyber weaponry both as a deterrent to, and leverage during conflicts. A potential downside of such state-by-state regulation is inhibition of the rapid innovation that the Internet has traditionally fostered and the curtailing of freedom of speech that has led to the social integration in the society. On the other hand, innovation and freedom cannot thrive in a chaotic environment with rampant crime and lack of rules, norms, and ethics. With this in mind, national policymakers face the challenge of striking a balance between regulation and potential chaos on the Internet while at the same time promoting freedom. In efforts to strike such a balance of national interests, borders in cyberspace have an important role to play along with international efforts to build trust in cyber space and to slow down the fragmentation of the Internet. This article discusses how the cyber conflicts are escalating, how mutual distrust is growing, and how nation states are adapting to the constantly changing cyber domain.
Towards A Mediterranean Arms Control Regime
This paper calls for establishing an arms-control regime in the Mediterranean region. It addresses the political determinants of such a regime in terms of regional relations and arms posture, and stands of regional and extra-regional powers. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, elimination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regulation and reduction of conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons (SALW), combatting illicit arms trade in the region and engagement of all the relevant States are imperative in determining the Mediterranean arms control structure. The main commitment of extra-regional powers should be nonviolation of the prospected Mediterranean arms-control regime, especially the WMD-free status whenever in force. For that sake, confidence-building measures should be adopted in order to build the three pillars of the regime: legal instruments, institutional structure, and monitoring and verification mechanisms. The Mediterranean arms control architecture could be easily crafted if it goes normative through creating a regional identity based on universal values, and supporting that normative transformation with a Mediterranean ‘Marshall Plan’. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) could be revitalized through the foundation of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean (CSCM) at the governmental level to be the permanent governing organ of the UfM with a view to administrate the arms control regime in the Mediterranean.
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The Concept of Deterrence and its Applicability in the Cyber Domain
This work is the product of a research, conducted in the course of the Master’s Program in International Security Studies and seeks to give cyber deterrence its deserved (non-technical) attention in the academia. It will focus in a first article on the concept of deterrence and its applicability in the cyber domain in general. The second part, in a later article, will scrutinize ways for Germany, as an important player in an ever more digitized international system, to approach a cyber deterrence strategy in order to bolster its national security interests.
Cyber space as the fifth domain is omnipresent and all developed states increasingly realize that international relations and typical domains of statehood change in the face of a global digitization. With the advent of game-changing technologies, traditional tools of statecraft, such as deterrence, seem disregarded as outdated in the national security strategy building process. Advanced states in particular depend heavily on an open and safe cyber domain but at the same time suffer from manifold vulnerabilities. The recent past showed that sophisticated cyber attacks have the potential to disrupt governments, economies and societies significantly and therefore pose a threat to core security interests. Deterrence, as classical tool in international relations, can help to bolster national security interests, even if the cyber domain requires some special considerations.
Therefore, the article explains basic mechanisms of deterrence in the nuclear age and in contemporary international relations, the legal framework of cyber space and possible ways to apply deterrence in the cyber domain. It aims to urge global leaders to thoroughly consider deterrence in the cyber domain as a powerful asset and to provide policymakers with options for action